Battle of maps: Congress vs Indian Army and Civil BureaucracyNovember 27, 2012
In this context here also should be noted that India’s armed forces and civil bureaucracy, and not the Congress party, have emerged the foundations of India’s nationalistic actions in external affairs. This is fully explained in Chapter 19 on pages 359-60 of my book: Silent Assassins, Jan 11, 1966.The book is available at www.amazon.com/
Assessed historically, India’s armed forces and civil bureaucracy, and not the Congress party, have emerged the foundations of India’s nationalistic actions in external affairs. Those groups have discovered the utility of the Hindu sub consciousness not only as vote getter but also as a barrier against undesirable foreign influences and as a source of internal strength in the matters of state, moreover, these groups have discovered a common purpose with the 100 million plus Indian middle class and overseas Indians who symbolized the dynamism of India. The coalition between the nationalistic, political and economical elites accounts for the resurgence of India’s private sector and this sector turned to the United States to select for high technology imports (For not political and military direction) and to Japan for high technology. .
Pt Nehru forgot the importance of Indian Army and did he busy in world politics. The book titled Genesis & Growth of Nehruism Vol 1 : comment to Communism written by the late Sita Ram Goel, reveals that Nehru’s Man Friday, V.K. Krishna Menon (who also served as India’s Defense Minister) whom everybody blamed for the Chinese debacle was in reality, a mere pawn in the larger-than-life games that Nehru played with India and the Indian people. A step further, the focus of this book lies in exposing Nehru as a true-blood Communist.
Kuldip Nayar writes: General P.N. Thapar, the then army chief, was reluctant to engage the Chinese. He told me in an interview in July 1970 that it would have been like ‘‘disturbing a hornet’s nest’’. He had also pointed out in a note soon after taking over in 1960 that army equipment was in such bad shape and in such short supply that China or Pakistan could easily defeat India. Why was he pushed? Who pushed him — Nehru or the then defense minister, Krishna Menon? The Henderson-Brooks report might throw some light on these questions.
Effect of 1962 War was such that ultimately Nehru died in 1964 due to that. Misuse of Army by Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi took their lives.
This is an attempt to reveal why we Indians could not free POK, parts of Kutch and of course, Karachi and Lahore after 1965 and 1971 wars as China had successfully annexed Aksai Chin and huge tracts of land in Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh after the 1962 war. Why our all victories in the war were went vain due to the treaties which were signed by the Pakistan to forget.
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