Global nuclear politics are once again escalating, prompting a critical question in New Delhi: should India revisit its thermonuclear ambitions? This debate has been reignited following reports of former US President Donald Trump suggesting the US military prepare for potential nuclear testing, ending a 30-year hiatus. Coinciding with alleged Russian tests of the Poseidon underwater drone and claims of Pakistan’s covert nuclear experiments, these events are unsettling the global strategic balance.
India, since its 1998 Pokhran-II tests, has maintained a policy of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ with a no-first-use (NFU) doctrine. However, the shifting international landscape is causing strategic thinkers to re-evaluate India’s long-term security interests. Some experts, like Professor Happymon Jacob, believe that if the US resumes testing, India should seize the opportunity to conduct its own thermonuclear tests, thereby validating its capabilities and addressing any doubts about its 1998 hydrogen bomb test.
With an estimated 180 warheads in 2025, India’s arsenal is substantial, though smaller than China’s projected 1,000 warheads by 2030. Pakistan’s growing arsenal, potentially reaching 200 warheads by 2028, adds to the regional complexity. China’s advanced DF-41 ICBM, with MIRV capabilities, further complicates India’s deterrence strategy.
Facing dual deterrence challenges from Pakistan and China, any decision by India to resume testing carries significant diplomatic implications. While its voluntary moratorium has bolstered its international image and facilitated key agreements, breaking it could invite criticism. Proponents argue, however, that in an era of intensifying great power competition, India cannot afford to fall behind technologically and must validate its thermonuclear designs and enhance its deterrence credibility.
